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In this paper the model of generalized coherent risk measures is considered. Within the bounds of the
model the properties of acceptance set are examined. A notion of elliptic cone is introduced. It is shown
that the elliptic cone can be used as an acceptance set. The properties of the elliptic acceptance cone,
particularly the interrelation between the cone shape and the risk aversion value, are studied.
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Introduction
We work in a probability space (Ω,A, P ), where Ω is a reference set, A — a σ-algebra speciﬁed
on Ω, P — a probability measure, speciﬁed on the sets of A.
Definition 0.1. A Risk X on (Ω,A) is any measurable mapping from Ω to R (a random
variable).
The set of all risks on (Ω,A) we denote by X .
1. Orders and Preferences on the Set of Risks
Natural Orders
We can specify order relation 6 on the set X :
X 6 Y ⇐⇒ P (ω : X(ω) 6 Y (ω)) = 1.
Strict order < is an order relation determined by:
X < Y ⇐⇒ P (ω : X(ω) < Y (ω)) = 1.
Suppose |Ω| = n. Then we can submit a σ-algebra A in the form of A = 2Ω. Probability
measures P on the measurable space can be represented as the elements of the standard simplex
in Rn:
Sn = {P = (p1, . . . , pn) ∈ Rn :
p1 > 0, . . . , pn > 0, p1 + · · ·+ pn = 1}.
The set of all risks X is isomorphic to Rn. Renumbering the elements of Ω in some arbitrary
way: Ω = {ω1, . . . , ωn} , we denote P (ωi) = pi, X(ωi) = Xi, i = 1, . . . , n. We identify random
the variables X ∈ X with the vectors X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Rn.
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We assume that X 6 Y if Xi 6 Y i for all i = 1, . . . , n.
Another way to specify an order on the set X is related to stochastic dominance. Denote by
F the set of all distribution functions, by FX — the distribution function of a random variable
X:
FX(x) = P (X 6 x).
Let Fk be a set of all distribution functions with ﬁnite values of k-th moments:
Fk = {F ∈ F : |µFk | <∞}, µFk =
∫ ∞
−∞
tkdF (t).
For a given F ∈ F specify a sequence of functions F (k), k = 1, 2, . . . :
F (1)(x) = F (x), F (k+1)(x) =
∫ x
−∞
F (k)(t)dt, −∞ < x <∞.
Suppose F,Q ∈ Fk. We say that Q has k-order stochastic dominance over F (F 6k Q), if
F (k)(x) > Q(k)(x), −∞ < x <∞.
We can also introduce strict stochastic dominance. Suppose F,Q ∈ Fk. We say that Q
strictly dominates F with the order k (F <k Q), if
F 6k Q and ∃ x ∈ R : F (k)(x) > Q(k)(x).
For the case of a ﬁnite reference set the orders 6 and 61 are consistent - from X 6 Y it follows
that X 61 Y . This is a consequence of the fact that for all X,Y ∈ X P (Xi) = P (Y i), i =
1, . . . , n.
By means of ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance we can determine an order relation 61 (<1)
on X :
X 61 Y (X <1 Y )⇐⇒ FX 61 FY (FX <1 FY ).
A Preference relation  on the set X is a complete transitive binary relation on X . Risks
X and Y are called equivalent if X  Y and Y  X.
Suppose that a preference relation reﬂects an individual attitude to risk of a certain investor.
The relation X  Y means that in equal conditions the investor prefers a ﬁnancial instrument
with return Y to an instrument with return X(or both instruments are equally preferable if
X ∼ Y ).
If to take into account that in equal conditions market participants seek to maximal proﬁts,
it is reasonable to require that a preference relation  on X should be conformed to the order
6 on X :
X 6 Y =⇒ X  Y.
Such preference relations are called monotone. They are called strictly monotone if
X < Y =⇒ X ≺ Y.
One of the ways to describe preferences on the set of all risks is to represent them by a
real-valued functional.
A preference relation is represented on X by a measure ρ : X → R if one of the following
conditions holds:
ρ(X) 6 ρ(Y ), if X  Y, X, Y ∈ X (1)
ρ(X) 6 ρ(Y ), if Y  X, X, Y ∈ X (2)
The functional ρ is called a risk measure.
Hereinafter we deal with risk measures that represent preference relations like in (1).
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2. Risk Aversion
Risk aversion is a disposition of a person to accept a bargain with an uncertain payoﬀ rather
than another bargain with a more certain, but possibly lower, expected payoﬀ. A preference 
on X is called risk averse if for all nonsingular risks ∆ : E∆ = 0 and any a ∈ R
a+∆ ≺ a. (3)
In terms of risk measure the property of risk aversion can be written as
ρ(a+∆) < ρ(a).
For some preferences we can get a numerical characteristic of risk aversion.
By Wa denote a degenerate risk localized at a ∈ R (P(X=a)=1). If a preference relation 
on X is conformed with 61 then Wa  Wb if a < b. Moreover it is logical to assume that the
preference is strict Wa ≺Wb.
A preference  on X is called regular if it is conformed with stochastic dominance 61, for all
a, b ∈ R : a < b Wa ≺Wb and in every equivalence class K ∈ X∼ there is exactly one degenerate
distribution.
It was shown in [1] that for regular preference (3) can be written as ∀∆ ∈ X : E∆ = 0, a ∈ R
∃ c > 0
a+∆ ∼ a− c (4)
If a regular preference on X is represented by a risk measure ρ (which is also called regular
in this case) then (4) can be written as
ρ(a+∆) = ρ(a− c).
Value c can be interpreted as a price for which a person agrees to accept uncertainty. It can
be used as a quantitative assessment of risk aversion that was introduced in [1].
A functional ρ : X → R is called canonical if ρ(Wa) = a ∀a ∈ R. Every regular risk measure
has a canonical analog.
For the canonical risk measure ρ value of risk aversion ca,ρ(∆) is a solution of
ρ(a+∆) = ρ(a− c). (5)
3. Generalized Coherent Risk Measures
The term "generalized coherent risk measure" was introduced in [2] and presented a modiﬁ-
cation of classical coherent risk measures introduced in [3].
We consider another modiﬁcation. It is also called generalized coherent risk measures because
it deﬁnes a broader class of functionals then classic coherent measures.
The axiomatics of generalized coherent risk measures is bases on the axiomatics of classical
coherent risk measures with some distinctions.
A risk is called acceptable if investor agrees to work with it without investing any capital.
The set of all acceptable to an investor risks is called an acceptance set and is denoted by
A (A ⊂ X ).
Suppose that |Ω| = n. Then X = (x1, . . . , xn) is a vector from Rn.
Also we introduce a norm ‖ · ‖ in Rn. It can be for example ‖ · ‖p (1 6 p <∞), given by
‖X‖p =
(
n∑
i=1
|xi|p
)1/p
, ‖X‖∞ = lim
p→∞
‖X‖p = max{|x1|, . . . , |xn|}
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We postulate that any acceptance set A satisﬁes the following axioms:
A1: C+ ⊂ A, C+ = {X ∈ X : X > 0}
A2: A
⋂
C− = ∅, C− = {X ∈ X : X < 0}
A3: A is a convex cone (if X ∈ A, Y ∈ A, then α1X + α2Y ∈ A, α1, α2 > 0).
A generalized coherent risk measure fA, associated with A is determined by
fA(X) = fA,‖·‖(X) = δA(X) inf
Y ∈∂A
‖X − Y ‖,
δA(X) =
{
1, X ∈ A,
−1, X ∈ Ac ,
(6)
where ∂A is a boundary of A.
The functional fA(X) exhibits the following properties:
M) monotonicity:
fA(X) 6 fA(Y ), ∀X,Y ∈ X ,X 6 Y ;
PH) positive homogeneity:
fA(λX) = λfA(X), ∀λ > 0,X ∈ X ;
S) superadditivity:
fA(X + Y ) > fA(X) + fA(Y ), ∀X,Y ∈ X ;
Sh) shortcut property:
∀X ∈ X ∃ X ′(X) ∈ ∂A that ‖X −X ′(X)‖ = inf
Y ∈∂A
‖X − Y ‖ and
fA(X + λu(X)) = fA(X) + λ, −∞ < λ 6 λA(X),
where λA(X) > 0, u(X) = δA(X)
X −X ′A(X)
‖X −X ′A(X)‖
It is obvious that the classical coherent risk measure is a particular case of generalized coherent
risk measures corresponding to the norm || · || = || · ||∞.
In [4] there is given a representation theorem for a generalized coherent risk measure, associ-
ated with an acceptance set A.
By X ∗ denote the dual space (the space of linear continuous functionals on X ), the dual cone
A∗ is deﬁned as
A∗ = {g ∈ X ∗ : g(X) > 0, X ∈ A}. (7)
Distinguish the subset of functionals with unit norm:
A∗1 = {g ∈ A∗ : ‖g‖∗ = 1}.
Theorem 3.1. Let f be a generalized coherent risk measure, defined by an acceptance set A.
Then the following representation is valid:
fA(X) = inf
g∈A∗
1
g(X), X ∈ X . (8)
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Value of Risk Aversion for Generalized Coherent Risk Measures
For a classical coherent risk measure ρ we can easily ﬁnd the value of risk aversion. Since this
measure of risk is canonical and possesses the property of translation invariance [3], we have:
cρ(∆) = −ρ(∆).
Consider a generalized coherent risk measure f(x). As it is not canonical, ﬁrst we ﬁnd its
canonical analog fKA :
fKA (X) =

f(X)
f(I)
, X ∈ A,
− f(X)
f(−I) , X 6∈ A.
Solving equation (5) for the measure fKA we ﬁnd:
ca,A(∆) =

a− fA(aI +∆)
fA(I)
, aI +∆ ∈ A,
a+
fA(aI +∆)
fA(−I) , aI +∆ 6∈ A
(9)
We obtain that in the model of general coherent risk measures risk aversion depends on a.
In particular,
c0,∆ =
f(∆)
f(−I) (10)
4. The Properties of Acceptance Sets
Consider two probability spaces (Ω,A, P ) and (Ω,A, Q). The sets of all risks, deﬁned on
them, we denote by XP and XQ, the acceptance sets - by AP and AQ.
Suppose XP = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ XP and XQ = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ XQ.
We assume AP = AQ if ∀XP ∈ AP ⇒ XQ ∈ AQ and vice versa, ∀XQ ∈ AQ ⇒ XP ∈ AP
Theorem 4.1. Let the preference relation  on XP and XQ be consistent with the stochastic
dominance 61. If P 6= Q and ∃ XP such that XP <1 XQ (or XQ <1 XP ), then AP 6= AQ.
Theorem 4.2. Let the preference relation  be risk averse. Then for all X ∈ A,X 6= 0 is true
that EX > 0. †.
Theorem 4.3. Let the preference relation  be consistent with stochastic dominance 61 and
P =
(
1
n ,
1
n , . . . ,
1
n
)
. Then for every X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) ∈ A, the vector Y which components
are obtained by interchanging the components of X also lies in the cone A (the cone is symmetric
about the coordinate axes).
Proof. Consider X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn) ∈ AP and a vector Y = (Xi1 ,Xi2 , . . . ,Xin), obtained
by interchanging the components of X.
Since P (Xj) = P (Y j) = 1/n, it follows that FX(x) = FY (x) ∀x ∈ R, then X ∼ Y and
fAP (X) = fAP (Y ). Therefore, X and Y belong or do not belong to the cone AP contemporane-
ously. 2
Theorem 4.4. Let the preference relation  be consistent with stochastic dominance. Then for
the acceptance cone AP (P = (p1, . . . , pk−1, 0, pk+1, . . . , pn)) it is true that
X = (X1, . . . ,Xk−1,Xk,Xk+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ AP ⇒
Y = (X1, . . . ,Xk−1, y,Xk+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ AP ∀y ∈ R.
†Theorems 4.1 and 4.2 were proved in [5]
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Proof. Suppose X ∈ AP .
FX(x) = FY (x) ∀x ∈ R
FX 61 FY ⇒ f(X) 6 f(Y );
FY 61 FX ⇒ f(Y ) 6 f(X).
Therefore, f(Y ) = f(X), thus we have X ∈ AP ⇒ Y ∈ AP . 2
Theorem 4.5. Let the preference relation  be consistent with stochastic dominance. Then the
acceptance cone AP , corresponding to P = (p1, . . . , pn), where pk = 1; pi = 0, i 6= k can be
defined by the inequality:
Xk > 0 (11)
Proof. Assume that there exists such vector
X = (X1, . . . ,Xk−1,Xk,Xk+1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ AP ,
that Xk < 0, but then by Theorem 4.4 the vector
Z = (−1, . . . ,−1,Xk,−1, . . . ,−1) ∈ AP ,
but this is impossible since Z ∈ C−, аnd C− ∩ AP = ∅ by the axiom A2. So, if X : Xk < 0,
then X 6∈ AP .
Suppose Xk > 0. Then by Axiom A1 X = (0, . . . , 0,Xk, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ AP , hence, by Theo-
rem 4.4
Y = (Y 1, . . . , Y k−1,Xk, Y k+1, . . . , Y n) ∈ AP
∀ Y 1, . . . , Y k−1, Y k+1, . . . , Y n ∈ R.
We obtain that if X is such that Xk > 0, then X ∈ AP . Hence, (11) actually determines the
acceptance cone for the given risk measure. 2
5. Elliptic Acceptance Set
Consider a set
n∑
i=1
(Xi − (P,X)npi)2
r2(pi)
6 (P,X)2, X = (X1, . . . ,Xn) ∈ Rn (12)
and suppose that it satisﬁes the following conditions:
1. (P,X) > 0;
2. r(p) >
√
n
p2
+ n3p2
(13)
Theorem 5.1. The set A, determined by inequality (12), is an acceptance set for some prefer-
ence.
Proof. For A to be an acceptance set it is suﬃcient to satisfy Axioms A1–A3.
1. First we prove that A satisﬁes A2: A ∩ C− = ∅. Consider an arbitrary X ∈ C−
Xi < 0 ∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n ⇒ (P,X) < 0, therefore, X doesn’t satisfy (13).
2. Then we prove A3: A is a convex set.
Let X ∈ A. Then (P,X) = a > 0 and
n∑
i=1
(Xi − anpi)2
r2(pi)
6 a2 (14)
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The set {Y : (P, Y ) = a} also satisﬁes (14) and it forms a n-dimensional ellipsoid Ea, which is
a convex set.
Suppose that X ′ = λX, λ > 0. Then (P,X ′) = λa. X ′ also belongs to A (It can be veriﬁed
by substituting in(12)).
Moreover, it belongs to the ellipsoid Eλa
(X1 − λanp1)2
r2(p1)
+ · · ·+ (X
n − λanpn)2
r2(pn)
6 λa2, (15)
like all other vectors Y ′ = λY, Y ∈ Ea. Hence, A is a cone and all its hyperplane sections
(P,X) = a, a > 0 are ellipsoids.
Therefore, A is a convex set.
3. At last we prove A1: C+ ⊂ A.
Consider the basis e = {ei, i = 1, . . . , n : eii = 1, eji = 0}.
Any vector X ∈ C+ can be represented as a convex linear combination of the elements of the
basis e:
X = X1e1 +X
2e2 + · · ·+Xnen, Xi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n
Since Axiom A3 is satisﬁed, we can assert that C+ ⊂ A, if ei ∈ A ∀i = 1, . . . , n.
Then we prove that e1 ∈ A (for the rest ei the proof is similar). Substitute coordinates of e1
in (12):
(1− np12)2
r2(p1)
+
(np1p2)
2
r2(pn)
+ · · ·+ (np1pn)
2
r2(pn)
=
1− 2np12 + n2p41
r2(p1)
+ n2p21
(
p22
r2(p2)
+ · · ·+ p
2
n
r2(pn)
)
6
6
1− 2np21 + n2p41
n
p2
1
+ n3p21
+ n2p21
(
p22
n
p2
2
+ n3p22
+ · · ·+ p
2
n
n
p2
n
+ n3p2n
)
6
p21
n
+ n2p21
n− 1
n3
= p21 = (e1, P )
2
Hence, ej ∈ A j = 1, . . . , n, thus, C+ ⊂ A. 2
Theorem 5.2. An elliptic cone A defines a reference consistent with stochastic dominance.
Proof. A preference relation determined by ρA is consisted with stochastic dominance if
∀X,Y : FX 61 FY it is true that ρA(X) 6 ρA(Y ).
In our case X and Y are discrete:
X = (X1,X2, . . . ,Xn), Y = (Y 1, Y 2, . . . , Y n)
It means that FX(x) > FY (x) ∀x is true iﬀ Xi 6 Y i i = 1, . . . , n, that is X 6 Y .
By Theorem 5.1 A is an acceptance cone and hence the risk measure ρA is coherent. Respec-
tively ρ(X)6ρ(Y ) if X6Y . It means that if FX 61 FY it is true that ρ(X) 6 ρ(Y ).
2
6. Some Special Cases of the Elliptic Acceptance Set
Case 1. Consider an elliptic cone AP such that P = (p1, . . . , pk−1, 0, pk+1, . . . , pn).
From Theorem 4.4 it follows that since X = 0 ∈ AP we have Y = (0, . . . , 0, y, 0, . . . , 0) ∈ AP .
Substituting P and Y in (12) we get
y2
r2(0)
6 0 ∀y ∈ R
Therefore, we have
r(0) =∞. (16)
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One can easily see that there are no summands corresponding to i1, . . . , im coordinates in
(12) if pi1 = · · · = pim = 0.
Case 2. Suppose AP is an elliptic cone corresponding to P = (p1, . . . , pn), pk = 1, pi =
0, i 6= k .
From Theorem 4.5 it follows that AP is speciﬁed by X
k > 0. Substitute P in (12) and (13).
We obtain
(Xk)2(1− n)2
r2(1)
6 (Xk)2, Xk > 0
r(1) > n− 1
(17)
The ﬁrst inequality in (17) is satisﬁed automatically if the last inequality in (17) is satisﬁed.
Hence, we get one more condition on the function r(p):
r(1) > n− 1. (18)
Case 3 Consider P = ( 1n , . . . ,
1
n ). Let the norm in X be Euclidean (‖ · ‖ = ‖ · ‖2).
Substituting P (12), we get the following inequality for AP :
(X1 − (P,X))2 + · · ·+ (Xn − (P,X))2 6 (P,X)2r2(1/n). (19)
By I we denote the unit vector (1, . . . , 1), and by r0 the following form r0 = r (1/n).
Combining this with (19), we obtain
‖X − (P,X)I‖ 6 (P,X)r0∥∥∥∥∥X − (I,X)n I
∥∥∥∥∥ 6 (I,X)n r0, (I,X) > 0. (20)
All sections of the cone by hyperplanes (I,X) = a are n-dimensional spheres of radius
(I,X)r0/n.
An acceptance cone is called a spherical cone if it is deﬁned by (20).
Risk Aversion for a Spherical Cone
Lemma 6.1. Let X be an Euclidean space, P = ( 1n , 1n , . . . , 1n), and let the acceptance cone A be
determined by the inequality
∥∥∥∥X − (I,X)n I
∥∥∥∥ 6 (I,X)n r0.
Then ∀∆ : E∆ = 0, ‖∆‖ = 1
inf
X∈∂A
‖X −∆‖ = ‖Z −∆‖, (21)
where Z =
(I, Z)
n
I +
(I, Z)r0
n
∆, (I, Z) > 0.
Proof. We claim that (∆, I) = 0. Indeed,
E∆ =
1
n
∆1 + · · ·+ 1
n
∆n =
1
n
(∆, I) = 0 =⇒ (∆, I) = 0
1. At ﬁrst we prove that Z ∈ ∂A:∥∥∥∥Z − (I, Z)n I
∥∥∥∥ = ∥∥∥∥ (I, Z)n I + (I, Z)r0n ∆− (I, Z)n I
∥∥∥∥ =
=
∥∥∥∥ (I, Z)r0n ∆
∥∥∥∥ = (I, Z)r0n ‖∆‖ = (I, Z)r0n ,
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therefore, Z ∈ ∂A.
2. Then we prove that ‖Z −∆‖ = inf
X∈∂A
‖X −∆‖. Suppose ∃ Y ∈ ∂A, then
‖Y −∆‖ 6 ‖Z −∆‖, (22)
Z −∆ and Y −∆ belong to the same plane. Hence, the triangle, constructed on these vectors,
belongs to this plane plane. Therefore, the condition (22) holds iﬀ cosβ > 0, where β =
(Y − Z )̂ (Z −∆).
Y can be written as
Y =
(I, Z)
n
I +
(I, Z)r0
n
∆+ (Y − Z).
Solve the optimization problem
‖Y −∆‖2 → min
Y ∈∂A
(23)
‖Y −∆‖2=
∥∥∥Y − Z + (I,Z)In +( (I,Z)r0n − 1)∆∥∥∥2= ‖Y − Z‖2 + (I,Z)2n2 I2 +( (I,Z)r0n − 1)2∆2+
+2
(
Y − Z, (I,Z)n I
)
+ 2
(
Y − Z,
(
(I,Z)r0
n − 1
)
∆
)
= ‖Y − Z‖2 + (I,Z)2n2 +
(
(I,Z)r0
n − 1
)2
+
+2
(
Y − Z, (I,Z)n I + (I,Z)n ∆−∆
)
= ‖Y − Z‖2 + (I,Z)2n2 +
(
(I,Z)r0
n − 1
)2
+ 2(Y − Z,Z −∆)
The optimization problem (23) is equivalent to the problem
b = ‖Y − Z‖2 + 2(Y − Z,Z −∆) → min
Y
b = ‖Y − Z‖2 + 2‖Y − Z‖ · ‖Z −∆‖ cosβ > 0
b = 0 if Y = Z
Finally, we obtain inf
X∈∂A
‖X −∆‖ = ‖Z −∆‖. 2
Theorem 6.1. Let X be an Euclidean space. The cone A is determined by
∥∥∥X − (I,X)n I∥∥∥ 6
(I,X)
n
r0.
Then ∀∆ : E∆ = 0, ‖∆‖ = 1 is true that
c0,∆ =
1√
n+ r20
(24)
Proof. Since Z⊥(∆− Z), by Pythagorean theorem we obtain
‖Z‖2 + ‖Z −∆‖2 = ‖∆‖2
‖Z −∆‖2 = 1− ‖Z‖2 (25)
On the other hand,
(I, Z)
n
I⊥(Z − (I, Z)
n
I), therefore, we get
‖Z‖2 =
∥∥∥∥ (I, Z)n I
∥∥∥∥2 + ∥∥∥∥Z − (I, Z)n I
∥∥∥∥ = (I, Z)2n2 ‖I‖2 + (I, Z)2r20n2 = (I, Z)2n
(
r20
n
+ 1
)
=
=
‖I‖2‖Z‖2 cos2 α
n
(
1 +
r20
n
)
, where α = Z∧I
‖Z‖2 = ‖I‖
2‖Z‖2 cos2 α
n
(
1 +
r20
n
)
– 459 –
Tatyana A.Kustitskaya Representation of Preferences by Generalized Coherent Risk Measures
cos2 α =
n
‖I‖2
(
1 +
r2
0
n
) = n
n+ r20
By Lemma 6.1 vector Z belongs to same two-dimensional plane as the vectors I and ∆.
Since I⊥∆, we have γ = Z∧∆ = pi
2
− α.
‖Z‖2 = ‖∆‖2 cos2 β = 1− cos2 α = r
2
0
n+ r20
Substituting this result in (25), we get
‖Z −∆‖ = n
n+ r20
∀∆ : E∆ = 0, ‖∆‖ = 1.
c20,∆ =
f2(∆)
f2(−I) =
n
(n+ r20)n
=
1
n+ r20
,
It now follows that (24) holds. 2
From Theorem 6.1 we get the following condition on r(p):
r
(
1
n
)
=
√
1− nc20,∆
c0,∆
(26)
7. Some Classes of Axial Functions
It follows from (12) that the function r(p) is a parameter of a cone which determines an
individual attitude to risk. It also determines how the attitude to risk changes depending on the
changes of the probability measure.
We have shown that the function satisﬁes the conditions (16), (18), (26). Is is also reasonable
to assume that r(p) is monotonically decreasing on [0, 1].
One of the ways to deﬁne an individual preference by an elliptic acceptance cone is to take
r(p) from some class of one-parameter functions (that satisfy (16), (18), (26)) and evaluate the
parameter according to the previous decisions of the individual.
8. An Example of an Axial Function
Assume that rm(p) =
√
n+ n3
pm
, m > 1 is an axial function. It obviously satisﬁes (16),
(18), (26). Consider two representatives of this class: r1(p) =
√
n+ n3
p
, r2(p) =
√
n+ n3
p2
. As
r1(p) 6 r2(p) ∀p ∈ [0, 1] we get that an individuum whose preferences are determined by the
function r1(p) is more cautious than an individuum whose preferences are determined by r2(p).
On Figure 1 we see acceptance cones for the case of two-dimensional space and P = (12 ,
1
2 ). A1
is an elliptic acceptance cone corresponded to r1, and A2 corresponds to r2. Note that A1 ⊂ A2.
Conclusion
The generalized coherent risk measures aﬀord the opportunity to value risk according to
individual preferences. The elliptic acceptance cone introduced in the paper is an instrument
for constructing such measures. As the parameter of the elliptic cone determines an individual
attitude to risk it should be studied more detail.
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Figure 1. Axial functions r1(p) and r2(p) and acceptance cones corresponded to them
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to professor A.A.Novosyolov and professor O.Yu.Vorobyev for useful
discussions of the topic.
References
[1] A.A.Novosyolov, Risk aversion: qualitative approach and quantitative assessments, Auto-
matics and telemechanics, 7(2003), 165–177 (Russian).
[2] R.A.Jarrow, A.K.Purnanandam, Generalized Coherent Risk Measures: The Firm’s perspec-
tive, Finance Research Letters, 2(2005), 23–29.
[3] Ph.Artzner, F.Delbaen, J.-M.Eber, D.Heath, Coherent measures of risk, Mathematical
Finance, 9(1999), 203-228.
[4] A.A.Novosyolov, Generalized coherent risk measures in decision-making under risk, Pro-
ceedings of the International Scientiﬁc School "Modelling and Analysis of Safety and Risk
in Complex Systems", 2005, 145–150.
[5] T.A.Kustitskaya, Acceptance cones for some preferences, Proceedings of the X International
FAMET’2011 Conference / Oleg Vorobyov ed. - Krasnoyarsk, KSTEI, SFU, 2011, 192–196.
Описание предпочтений на множестве рисков с помощью
обобщенных когерентных мер риска
Татьяна А.Кустицкая
В работе рассматривается модель обобщенных когерентных мер риска. В рамках этой модели
изучаются свойства множеств приемлемых рисков. Вводится понятие эллиптического конуса
приемлемых рисков. Рассматриваются его свойства, в частности взаимосвязь между формой
конуса и величиной неприятия риска.
Ключевые слова: отношение предпочтения, стохастическое доминирование, мера риска, неприя-
тие риска, обобщенные когерентные меры риска, множество приемлемых рисков, эллиптический
конус.
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